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ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION
Respondent's brief raises some points not covered I

I

in Appellant's brief, as well as a Cross-Complaint.
One of the points raised by Respondent concerns
matters allegedly raised for the first time on appeal and
which were not raised in the pleadings or argued to the
trial Court.

This requires a response and some considerabJI

amount of argument to explain,

which Appellant has include.

in this Reply Brief.
Other points covered in this Reply Brief respond
to points raised in Respondent's brief which are inaccuratt
or which are misleading unless explained in greater detail
than is set forth in Appellant's brief.
By way of additional comment, Appellant wishes tol
respond to Respondent's assertion on Page 9 of its brief
that "apparently there is no challenge to other Conclusion
of Law, except number 2."

This is factually not true, and

Appellant wishes to be understood as being opposed to a
nwnber of the Conclusions of Law as well as various

Findin~:

of Fact since Appellant believes many of them to be imprope:
or inaccurate.

Appellant did not attempt to catalogue all

its objections since many, al though believed to be erroneou'
are not critical to Appellant's theory of this case.
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POINT I
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE
MEANING AND EFFECT OF CONCLUSION OF
LAW NUMBER TWO IS ERRONEOUS.
Respondent's argument in Point I concerning the
distinction between what Appellant asserts is a finding
that Respondent was excused from having to comply with the
"split stockpile" provision by the Court and what Respondent
asserts is a finding that "Respondent was led to believe
that what it did was in compliance with contract requirements" is a legal fiction.

Respondent's argument merely

proves Appellant's contention to the effect that Respondent
intended to mislead Appellant into believing that it intended
to comply with the split stockpile provision as set out in
the contract while all along it intended to circumvent the
requirement to construct separate sized piles of aggregate.
(See Appellant's Argument on this point in Section I of its
brief.)
If in fact Respondent at the time it submitted its
alternate proposal did not intend to colocate the piles of
separate sized aggregate at the hot mix plant, why didn't it
say so in its proposal?

Again, if this was its intent at

that time, why didn't it advise the engineer that what it
planned to do did not in fact "meet the intent" of the specification when it received the reply from the State's engineer?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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(Exh. P-3).

Appellant does not agree that Respondent

or the trial judge were correct in Conclusion of Law No.

1

that "there was no requirement in the contract as to where'
the three stockpiles were to be located."

A fair reading

of the specification reveals that it is talking about how
aggregate piles are to be stored and the composition of tht
piles.

It also says "the minus 4 aggregate shall be

a uniform rate."

(Exh. D-4, Sheets 56 and 57)

f~~

It is an

inescapable conclusion that if you feed the "minus 4 aggre·
gate at a uniform rate'' you have to mix in aggregate larger
than number 4, or you will not meet specification reguiremq
Thus, the location of the piles at the hot plant site is

Sf~

fied at least by implication, since one pile alone would nc
suffice.
Nhether the Court concluded that Respondent was "e
cused" from complying with the specification on aggregate !
I

storage, or merely "led to believe" that what it did was in,
I

compliance with the requirement. is really immaterial.

The/

net effect is the same and in either instance the Court wasl
i

wrong.

I

Without the testimony of Appellant's engineer 1~ho I
was stricken a few days prior to trial by a stroke and
1

in

coma during the first phase of trial (R. 677) and deceased

'I
I
I

during the second phase, the Appellant was unable to ascertt
why Respondent was permitted to start production of asphalt!
I
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without the storage of aggregate in separate sized piles
at the plant site.

The record shows that Respondent had

continued to assure Appellant that the piles would be located at the hot plant as late as Sept. 16, 1975, which was
two days before production began.

(R. 655)

1

In fact, on this

date Appellant's engineer Burgess told Wood he had to have
"three" piles to be in specification.

(R. 673}

On September

23, 1975, Appellant's engineer Burgess by letter directed
that "two or more piles be located at the plant."

(Exh. P-5)

If Appellant's engineer permitted Respondent to proceed without the requisite piles at the hot plant, it was not authorized by any contract modification in writing.

If it was done

by verbal permission of Appellant's engineer, then Respondent
should have known that Appellant's engineer Burgess did not
have the authority to change the specification as he had already stated in writing.

(Exh. D-9)

The record also shows

that Appellant's chief materials engineer had specifically
told Mr. Wood of Respondent that the use of one stockpile
was not acceptable in a meeting on August 20, 1975.
289}

(R. 286-

In view of the letter from Burgess dated September 23,

1975 (Exh. P-5) it appears that the engineer had not in fact
authorized Respondent to proceed without the multiple piles
at the hot plant site.

The record shows that the Appellant's

understanding was that the piles of different sized aggregate
referred to in Respondent's proposal of May 28, 1975 would be
located at the plant site.

(R. 678)

1
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Respondent in Point I of its brief refers to
Conclusions of Law numbered 6,7, and 8 which deal with
the bituminous surface course gravel and which demonstrate
substantial compliance with the acceptance criteria for
that product.

Respondent asserts that because it met the

acceptance criteria for payment, its failure to follow the
method specification (if that in fact was the case) is
"harmless error."

Appellant submits that this is false,

They are two entirely different matters.

Respondent is

suggesting here that since he can meet the payment specification he should not be required to follow the "method !
specification."

This ignores the fact that the "method

specification" is an integral part of the contract.

A~

pellant' s witnesses Stephensen and Peterson testified concerning the importance of the "method" at great length.
(R. 289-290 and R. 474-486) 1 The record further demonstrates the fallacy of the Court's Conclusions 6,7 and 8.
Appellant submits that had the contractor followed the
"method" it might have been in "full" compliance rather
than "substantial."

In any event, Respondent's ability to

meet the payment specification doesn't justify failure to
follow the "method" specification.

It should be observed

here that the trial Court avoids this pitfall by its Findin1
of Fact No. 8 to the effect that Mr. wood of Respondent was
informed by Mr. Anderson of Appellant that Sheet No. 56
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(aggregate storage) of the special provisions (Exh. D-4)
would not apply.

Its further Conclusion of Law No. 2

based on this Finding of Fact regarding the Respondent
"being led to believe an adjustment in the specification
would be made,'' thus renders the testimony of several of
Appellant's witnesses moot on the point of the necessity
of following the method specification.
Appellant asserts that the evidence of its witnesses shows the absolute necessity of the method being
followed.

Again, Respondent's ability to stay within "sub-

stantial compliance" under the pay specification is not the
issue, and the Court's findings in this area, while not specifically contested, are simply unnecessary.

A comparison

of these findings with Exhibit No. D-12 reveals their inaccuracy in any event.
In any event, let it be clearly understood that
Appellant here objects to Conclusion of Law No. 2 if it in
fact means anything different than that Respondent is excused
from compliance with the "split stockpile" requirement.

Ap-

pellant further takes issue with Conclusion of Law No. 4 to
the effect that there was no requirement in the contract as
to where the three stockpiles were to be located for the reason
set forth above, i.e., that the implication is that the piles
(at least two) would be colocated at the plant site to allow
material to be fed at a "uniform rate."

Respondent further
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disagrees that "plaintiff (Respondent) was reasonably

1~

to believe that it was in compliance with the requirement
of said construction contract" as suggested by
No. 6.

Conclus~

Appellant submits that the evidence is quite the

contrary and shows, if anything, that Respondent was prot
ing that it would comply while all along it had no intent:
of complying.
Appellant further disagrees that Appellant breac'
the contract and specifically disagrees with the assertio:
Respondent on page 11 of its brief that a "reversal of

p~

graph 2 of the findings would not require a reversal of p:
graphs 7, 8 and 9."

What Appellant has urged and argued:

its brief is that if Respondent in fact has failed to com;:
with its alternate proposal contained in its letter of Mail
1975 (Exh. D-1), then it is guilty of the "first

breac~t

whether or not Appellant in fact breached the contract as
concluded in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the Conclusions oft
is immaterial.
Appellant submits that if its letter of September
25, 1975 (Exh. P-6) is looked at in a "vacuum" it is easri

conclude that it may constitute a breach.

On the other ht

when it is placed in context with previous discussions ani
correspondence [Aug. 20, 1975 meeting (R. 286-289)1, Sept ..
1975 conversation (R. 655i1 and Exh. P-5) it is apparent

t~

it was an attempt to insure compliance by Respondent with
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what it had previously agreed to do.

Coupled with the

fact that payment was ultimately made for the material
referred to in said Exhibit,(R. 305, 316) 2 it is evident
that the Court is in error in concluding that Appellant's
letter of Sept. 25, 1975 was in fact a breach of contract.
(Finding of Fact No. 21)
Therefore, if it is concluded that Conclusion of
Law No. 2 is incorrect, then it means that Respondent was
not "lead to believe that the contract would be modified
or that what it in fact did was in compliance with the contract."

This would leave Respondent subject to contract

requirements, and Appellant submits that the evidence
demonstrates that what Respondent did was not in compliance
with its own written proposal since it was, at the least,
interpreted differently by the parties with the responsibility for the ambiguity placed on the Respondent.

This

leaves Respondent in the position of committing the first
breach even if Appellant can be considered to have breached
the contract by its subsequent letter of September 25, 1975.
(Exh. P-6)
POINT II
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS CONCERNING RESPONDENT'S
''FIRST BREACH" AND "ELECTION OF REMEDIES'' WERE
RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE NOT WAIVED
UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
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On page 13 of Respondent's brief it is asserted
that the point concerning the "election of remedies" ana
"election to continue performance" of the contract by Respondent were not raised before the trial Court but raise
for the first time on appeal.

This assertion is not true,

the record of the trial discloses that this point was raL
on page 700 of the record of the first phase of the trial,
At the commencement of trial Appellant sought leave to am'
its answer to raise the defense of performance by Pritchet
Construction as a waiver of the breach.

The exchange bet;

Court and counsel cited above raises this defense as
dustrial.

~t

Initially, it was Appellant's belief that perft

mance by Industrial subsequent to Sept. 26, l975 did notq
any of its rights.

Appellant subsequently determined that

this performance by Industrial was after receipt of Appe!LI
letter clearly advising Respondent that any
be "pursuant to the contract.''

lExh. P-10)

performance~

Appellant ada.

tionally believes and therefore submits that any perforrnar.,
for whatever reason is either a waiver of the right to cla:
a breach or an election of remedy to proceed with perfornr
The Respondent also asserts on page 12 of its brii,
that the point concerning "first breach'' of the contracto:I
I

Respondent was not raised before the trial Court.
also not accurate.

This is

The trial of this matter was bifurcatel

The first part was to determine whether the Appellant had

1

I
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breached the contract.

This portion was tried on March 25,

26, 27, and on April 1, 1976.

At the conclusion of this

phase of the trial each of the parties submitted extensive
Memorandums of Points and Authorities.
on April 1, 1976.

These were submitted

In its Memorandum the Appellant raised

the issue of first breach of the contract on pages 5 and 22.*
The point concerning waiver of the breach by Respondent is
argued on pages 15 and 16 of said memorandum under Section IV.
Appellant's Motion to Add the Defense Concerning
Election and Waiver as to Performance by Pritchett Construction
co. was submitted March 19, 1976.
Authorities is dated April 1, 1976.

The Memorandum of Points and
There were 4 days of trial

in the interim with the major focus concentrated on the issue
of breach of contract.

By the time the Memorandums were sub-

mitted on April 1, 1976, the issues were much more sharply defined than in prior pleadings to the Court.
There was no formal request to amend the pleadings
to conform to the evidence and particularly as regards the
legal issues we are concerned with here.

It is clear, how-

ever, that there was no objection by Respondent to these issues
being raised and argued either by a written objection subsequent
to April 1, 1976 or a statement for the record when the trial
resumed on June 30, 1976.

During the interim, and specifically

on the 20th day of April, 1976, counsel for the parties met with

*

Pages Q

BO

and Q 97 in the Record of Pleadings.
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the trial Judge in Fillmore when the Court ruled that A~
pellant breached the contract.

The Court during that Pro.

ceeding made the following statement in announcing its
ruling:
• • • And the Court further finding that
any additional work done by the Plaintiff and/
or his Joint Venturer, to-wit: Pritchett Construction Company, was performed for the safety
of the public and as an essential, necessary~
and mitigating work for the safety of the general
public, and did not, in fact or in lieu, waive~
the breach of the contract, or any rights plaTntiff had thereunder, or any duty or obligations
that the plaintiff had . • . . (Emphasis s upplied,i
(R.P.3 of April 20, 1976 Proceedings at Millard
County Courthouse, Fillmore.)

I
I

Note in the emphasized language the Court is referring to
work done by Industrial Construction Co.

1

I

In the case of General Insurance Co. of America v.1
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, this Court said the

I

following:
There must, of course, be either expres:
or implied consent of the parties for the trial of
Implied cons~
issues not raised in the pleadings.
may be found where one party raises an issue mater
to the other party's case, or where evidence is in'
duced without objection. (Citation)
Significantly, the first part of Rule lS(b) i
not permissive in terms, for it provides that issu'•
tried by express or implied consent shall be treat'
as if raised in the pleadings. (Citation to 3 Moon
Federal Practice, 2d Ed. p. 991)
Even failure~
amend does not affect the results of the trial of
these issues.
More recently this Court in the case of L.A. Young Sons~
struction Company v. County of Tooele, et al., decided Febr
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14, 1978, cited the holding in the General Insurance co. case
and sustained that case.

Factually, in the Young case, there

was an objection raised to the attempt to raise different issues during the trial.

In the instant case there was no ob-

jection to the issues concerning waiver of the breach by performance subsequent to that event by Respondent's election of
remedies, and the point concerning first breach was likewise
not objected to.

The precedent of the General Insurance Co.

case should therefore be controlling in this matter, and Appellant should not be foreclosed from raising this matter on
appeal.
POINT III
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ANTICIPATED PROFITS IS
IN ERROR AND RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF IS INCORRECT.
Respondent in Point IV of its brief alleges that the
trial Court did not err in its award of anticipated profits.
Appellant does not disagree with the legal authorities cited
by Respondent but does take issue with the conclusions Respon-

dent arrives at to the effect that they sustain the damages
awarded by the trial Court for anticipated profits.
The main area of. disagreement is with the assertion
on page 33 of Respondent's brief that four deductions totaling
$166,876.38 which Appellant contends reduce available monies
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.
remaining in the contract at the time of th e

c ourt

determir

breach should not be deducted but should in fact be added
the computation set forth in Appellant's brief.

This wouJ'.

demonstrate that sufficient monies are in fact available tc
allow an award of anticipated profit as great as that awar:
by the trial Court.

A closer look at this will dernonstrat:

that not only is Appellant correct but that the possibilitr
of any money for anticipated profit is even more tenuous

e.

asserted by Appellant in its calculations set forth in Poir
III of its brief on appeal.
The four i terns which total the sum of $166, 876,J~
are as follows:
Offset for finishing subgrade embankment

$11,on

Stipulated offset for finishing top soil,
clean up, etc.

26,Jtj

Adjustment for overpayment of roadway
excavation

61,%~

Adjustment for top soil quantity included
in roadway excavation

68,01~

The first item is the amount Respondent conceded it would c1
to finish the subgrade embankment.

Payment for this work

i*

included item in the contract pay item of roadway excavatio
Appellant's evidence on this point was that i t would costi
much as $132,625.62

(R. 453) 2 to do this work, but the

trial~

accepted Respondent 1 s self-serving "opinion estimate" (whici
incidentally was virtually unsupported by any calculations:
was strictly the opinion of Mr. Wood) instead of considerir
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pellant's mass of evidence based on actual experience with
this contractor on a job contemporaneous with and which was
similar in scope, terrain, men and equipment to the subject
2
project. (R. 174-223 and Exh. D-61 and D-62) To the extent
that Respondent is incorrect in his estimate, the $90,301.35
which Appellant's calculation assertsismaximurn available
revenue for profit would be reduced accordingly.

In any

event, the figure of $11,055.00 represents the minimum actual
cost to do the work and would not increase available revenues
which would generate a profit.
The stipulated offset for finishing topsoil, clean
up, etc. in the amount of $26,301.48 is again an offset for
work unfinished on the date of the Court determined breach
and represents the cost of doing work which is included in
payment already received by Respondent.
As to these two items it could be argued that in
the ordinary course Respondent would have recovered these
amounts and should not be penalized.

The answer to that is

that the evidence at trial in effect demonstrates that Respondent has already recovered his anticipated profit in
that he has recovered the full contract unit price without
fully completing the work.

Therefore, if Respondent is al-

lowed to recover anticipated profit in addition to these
amounts it results in a double recovery.

For that reason

the reduction is proper.
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The last two items of "roadway excavation" and
adjustment for topsoil are both the result of adjustmenb
to previously estimated payments of the roadway excavation
pay item based on actual measurements.

As to the topsoil,

payment is made under the pay item for "topsoil, state furnished" at $1.00 per cubic yard as opposed to $0.92
pay i tern of "roadway excavation. "

for~

The record shows that

separate measurements of topsoil amounts were kept and computed into yardage.

(R.

310)

2

In paragraph 28 of the

Fine~

of Fact the Court has properly allowed this reduction.

In;j

graph 26 of the Findings of Fact the Court has provided for!
ment of the topsoil.

As to the roadway excavation deductio:

measurements of the partially completed work revealed an ov
payment in the dollar amount of $68, 018. 82.

(Exh. D-67)

0

Int

di tion, the testimony of James Cox which was unrefuted in tl
I

record revealed that the remaining amount of roadway excavat
was estimated to be 303, 000 cubic yards (R. 247) instead of!
I

432, 967, which would be the mathematical difference between1

the amount paid for and the total planned quantity.

(Exh,

D-1

Any underrun in gu~nti ty either. f~om actual measurement or .I
based upon the estimate of remaining work means a corresponc!
ing reduction in available dollars remaining in the contract
Respondent's counsel in his agreement under Point IV of Re·
spondent' s brief is assuming that a deduction for an overpa1
to the contractor means the money is available to the contra·
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As can be seen, this is not true.
of a pay item underruns

If the planned quantity

for whatever reason, the estimated

contract amount is reduced accordingly.

In the case of

roadway excavation remaining to be done at the time of the
court determined breach, the question is moot anyway.

The

testimony of Respondent's witness Hitchcock established that
there is no profit in the remaining roadway excavation because the cost of performing the work equals the return.
2
(R. 109)
Appellant submits that contrary to Respondent's
assertion, the deductions are proper in Appellant's calculations.
On page 34 of Respondent's brief it is argued that
the Appellant's witness Rowley justified an award of 30% profit.
This is an outright distortion of the testimony of the witness
Rowley.

The evidence shows that 30% is added on to the total

labor amount, but not to equipment charges.
109.04)

(Exh. D-2, Sec.

This is quite different from the assertion of a 30%

profit as claimed by the witness Hitchcock.

In fact the wit-

ness Rowley testified that the 30% added on to the labor amount
was for " • • • fixed costs, plus profit, fixed costs (sic),
supervision and profit." [R. 210)

2

It is clear that Respondent has not successfully
refuted Appellant's claim that the money remaining in the contract at the time of the Court determined breach would not
justify an award of anticipated profit in excess of $90,301.35,
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and then only if one assumes that Respondent's optimistic
cost projections are correct.

POINT IV
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING GENERAL DAMAGES.
Appellant submits that the arguments advanced by
Respondent do not alter the fact that there is no substanti:
evidence before the Court relating to "general damages." I:
facts asserted by Respondent on page 36 are at the best ont.
half true.

For instance, fact number 1 there set forth

that "Plaintiff had the contracting capacity to bid

all!~

and~~

this contract, amounting to almost $7,000,000 . . • • "

The

truth is Respondent had to enter into a joint-venture

agre~j
I

with Pritchett Construction Co. in order to bid the project,;

(R. 419-420) 1
Respondent has also inserted a "bootstrap argumen:
on page 37 of its brief as follows:
It is most probable, in view of the
amounts involved, that the trial Court
would have awarded damages in a greater
amount, but limited the recovery to $100,000
because that was all that was prayed for in
plaintiff's complaint.
The "amounts involved" are really immaterial unless they re
ably relate to a "damage" that is supported by "substantial
dence."
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Appellant by way of argument to counter Respondent's argument as set forth would simply observe that he
has never known an attorney to draft a complaint seeking
general damages which did not pray for more than he believed
the damages to be.
The trial Court was in error to award the full
claimed amount without substantial evidence in the record.
POINT V
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO ARGUHENTS BY
RESPOHDENT THAT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF VARIOUS OTHER
DAMAGE ITEMS.
A.

COSTS OF WATER
On pages 38 and 39 of its brief Respondent argues

that payment for water is not included in the pay item for
"mobilization" and that Respondent's allocation of water costs
to other contract items that required water is proper.

In

support of this argument Respondent cites Section 207 (Exh.
D-2, pp. 82-83) of the Standard Specifications which is entitled "watering" and argues that this "shows that payment for
water is not normally included under the heading of 'rnobilization.' " (Emphasis supplied.}
In the subject contract there was no separate pay
item for "watering."

Unless Appellant is grossly mistaken i t

seems that this makes Section 601.01 directly applicable.

Re-
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spondent's arguments are therefore moot, and regardless of
the testimony in support of Respondent's claim it cannot
alter the contract provision.

To rule otherwise invites

the possibility of a double recovery for this amount.
B.

BITUMINOUS PAVING DONE AFTER BREACH AND OFFSET CLAIMED
BY APPELLANT BUT NOT ALLOWED BY THE COURT.
These two items and the arguments advanced by

Respondent illustrate the hypocrisy and inconsistency of
the Court 1 s ruling regarding damages better than anything
else in the judgment.
The Court, even though it found the contract to
have been breached on September 25, 1975 by Appellant, neve:!
theless allowed Respondent to recover for paving work done:

I
1
,

October of 1975 under a "force account" or cost-plus formuLi
I

which is a contract method used when an agreement for extral
work cannot otherwise be arrived at.

This was permitted by

l

the Court even though the Appellant had notified Respondent
in writing (Exh. P-10) that work performed would be consider
part of the contract.
Contrast the foregoing with the approach taken by

I

the Court in rejecting Appellant's evidence regarding the cc
of finishing portions of the subgrade which were uncompletec
as of September 25, 1975.

Appellant's evidence was basedoi

a force account approach using actual figures construct~fi
labor and equipment reports on a job similar in scope, terra
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equipment, manpower and supervision contemporaneous with the
subject project involving Respondent contractor.

This "force

account" a~proach revealed that the actual cost to Respondent
of this "finish" work was $0.27 per square yard.

Appellant's

evidence defined in detail the yardage requiring finishing
and was illustrated by over thirty photographs.
however, rejected this approach.
totaled $132,625.62.

(R. 453)

The Court,

The dollar amount involved

2

Respondent in its brief quotes Mr. Rowley as having
testified that this was what it would "cost the State if the
work was done on force account." (R. 193)

2

Appellant's response

is that it only wants the Court to be consistent.

If it is go-

ing to use a force account approach against Appellant, then it
should also apply that formula against Respondent in a similar
situation.

In other words, to use an old adage, "what's good

for the goose is good for the gander."
For the Court's information, the amount the Court
allowed Respondent to recover for paving work done in October
1975 is $49,554.18.

This is in addition to the contract price

already paid based on the unit price.

The amount Appellant seeks

to offset for the cost of finishing subgrade is $132,625.62. The
Court allowed $11,055.00.

The offset is to reduce the amount

already paid for roadway excavation totaling over one million
dollars to allow for finishing work which is an included element
in the unit price for roadway excavation.
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If the Court's ruling is allowed to stand as to
these two items, it can be readily seen that Respon d ent g:
the "best of both worlds."

Some relief is obviously due!

pellant.
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD
ADDITIONAL MONEY TO RESPONDENT FOR EXPENSE
OF RENTED EQUIPMENT.
In Point VII of its brief, the Respondent asserts
that the Court was in error in that it failed to award the
Respondent damages totaling $446, 531. 42 for equipment rent
from others.

The Court awarded the st.UU of $191,370.00.

Appellant in Point V of its brief has argued that,
I

the Court is in error in its ruling and that the amount a1t
is excessive.

l'Vhile conceding that in a bona fide breach!;

contract it is proper to award damages for equipment renta!i
the Appellant nevertheless asserts that those damages

te~
I

if the rental agreements can be cancelled without penalty1j
can be converted to a purchase contract and when it appear!I
that substantial equity benefits have accrued.
Appellant asserts that the rights of the parties:
the instant case were fixed as of October 22, 1975 when thi
Respondent stated it considered the contract terminated. !
spondent in its brief argued that if Appellant had "recogni

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

its own breach of contract" that the "contention of Appellant would have merit."

Obviously, the parties on

September 25, 1975, October 22, 1975 and at the present
time do not agree that a breach of the contract did or
did not occur.

Appellant still does not believe that it

occurred, and Respondent obviously asserts that it did.
The point is that the Respondent elected to stand on the
alleged breach as of October 22, 1975, and that date should
fix the liability of the parties and govern the consequences.
It can readily be seen that if the agreements could have been
terminated without penalty as of that date, that the Court's
award is at least three times what would have been appropriate.

To say that because Appellant refuses to admit it

breached the contract justifies Respondent in retaining the
equipment and incurring additional rental is ridiculous.
Having elected to stand on the breach, Respondent incurs a
duty to mitigate its damages.
The Court's award of $191,370.00 should be reduced
if anything, but certainly should not be increased as urged
by Respondent.
CONCLUSION
Appellant having responded to the points raised in
Respondent's brief, including some new matters, submits that
the relief requested in Appellant's brief is appropriate and
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requests that the Court consider the relief requested on
appeal as set forth in said brief.
Respectfully submitted this

i'f!f(_ day of May, 1911

sistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that two copies of the

foregoi~

Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Jom
G. Marshall of Tuft and Marshall, Attorneys for Respondent,
603 East 4500 South, Suite B, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107,
this

/9/Z

day of May, 1978.
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